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The Hostage Rescue Attempt In Iran, April 24-25, 1980



The sound file below is the actual recording made on April 25 when our ship officially informed us of the crash at Desert One. It is an add-on, you may need to click RUN-ADD-ON at the top of the page, and a small Mini Media Player will appear.
 I made this recording by holding up a tape recorder to the closed circuit tv in the berthing area on board the USS Okinawa. It is the actual speech by Jimmy Carter to the United States. It is the official way we were told of the crash. What is interesting, it was played by the BBC, we did not record the Voice of America! This recording is a little scratchy, but it is the authentic recording taken while I was standing under the closed circuit television in the troop berthing area.

New letters have come in from several people who were at Desert One. They are printed below with permission. They requested that their identities be witheld.

Hi Marine,

A friend just recently told me of you website and I wanted to thank you for your efforts. It's hard to believe all of that occurred almost 24 years ago, but your site brought it all back.. I decided to thank you, because I've placed it in my mind's "lock box" for a long time.

I was an AE2 in HM-14 at the time and about 40 days from the end of my enlistment. I had a job line up (with the company I work for to this day - Sikorsky) and was making plans to leave the family behind for 1 - 2 years to work in Iran - of all places. They had RH-53s too.

Right after the hostage taking, as reported, HM-16 got packed out to the IO. A couple days later, at HM-14 we got directed to put 5 or 6 aircraft on the line ready for flight and have no one around them. A Marine helo came in dropped crews and took the aircraft to "an undisclosed location". I think it was about a week later, the aircraft returned and my Skipper called me in and gave me orders for accompany a flight of three aircraft cross country to Yuma and stay behind for 10 days to provide AFCS training to "service personnel" and then return to homebase for processing out. Enroute one of the aircraft developed a problem and I stayed with it in Nashville to change out an Accessory gearbox. So when we arrived at Yuma MCAS, we were alone. The next morning our aircraft was gone and within a few hours the crew, except for me, was directed to get transport back to Norfolk. Around 1400, waiting in the Operations Building, I met Col. Pitman for the 1st time. "get your ass on that Huey out there and keep your mouth shut unless I ask you a question! CLEAR?!" And so, this ground pounding electrician was in.

We flew to a remote airfield (we didn't actually operate out of Yuma) where the Colonel handed me over to a Marine Gunner (everyone called him Dad - I called him Sir for the 1st weeks). He and a Marine Sgt (John Harvey) got me signed in (Non-Disclosure and National Security stuff) and billeted. Over the next few months John and I worked closely together since he was an electrician also. He was a sharp, straight shooter and we respected each other professionally and personally. One thing that didn't seem to come out were the false "go's".

It's a long time ago, but I remember packing up a couple times before April (when the weather would have been more reliable), but got turned back because "Washington wasn't ready". During our time "out West" it is amazing that we didn't lose anyone or aircraft. The Navy pilots were doing things they'd never done before and more than one aircraft showed the damage. The Marines got to have their fun with the "Squid", teaching me some hand to hand, aircrew and weapons training. I'd never fired an M16 or a .50 cal., hell I was a mine sweep ground pounder. Dewey Johnson got the weapons training task - I got a broken nose from the 50 cal recoil (too long a story for here) and Dewey about peed himself laughing. But, he was a great guy and an artist with that 50.

But, we did finally get the Go. From my perspective the unit had gelled in the time we were in AZ and we were ready for the mission. When we got to Nimitz, HM-16 had the aircraft ready. Of course I knew most of the guys in 16 and we went over each aircraft...so I know they were as good as they could be. Until two days before the final go (4/22), as far as I knew I was going to be left behind and only six aircraft were launching. But, it was 1st decided all eight would launch, in case something happened during launch and then it was passed that Dash 7 & 8 would go to "feet dry" and then return and finally we were going the whole route. So, John and I were both going. John was primary so he was assigned to Dash 3 and I got Dash 8. I'd spent alot of time with John and Dewey and really wanted to be in their crew, plus the pilots (Schaeffer and Petty) were the best in the unit (my opinion).

Command didn't want John and I together in case an electrician were needed and one of us didn't get to the site(s). At any rate, we were set, but then shit started to happen. 1st it was the hangar deck fire extinguisher, then one of the senior enlisted Marines got hurt loading internal fuel cells and then we were told to lighten the aircraft (funny, the scene from Pearl Harbor about the Doolittle Raid reminded me so much of the frenzy). Even still - with the internal fuel, spare parts I "acquired" and extra ammo, 8 was probably 10k over max gross weight at takeoff. I remember looking at the other aircraft as we rolled off Nimitz at dusk thinking what a great picture it would make.

So we flew....the crew of Dash 8 was a Marine Captain and a Navy LCDR (later a squadron Commander and ultimately a Captain) a Marine SSgt, a Navy AMH1 and me (2nd crewman). As was reported, all went well initially, in a trail formation. We saw Six going down and followed.

By the time we landed and I ran to them, they had shut down and were inspecting the blades. The real problem wasn't so much the blade as the fact the aircraft had sunk to it's belly in the VERY soft sand and might go ground resonant of a re-start. So it was left there (never found to this day, as far as I know) and the crew boarded 8. Of course we'd lost the formation by then and proceeded alone. The came the sand/dust storm. I don't know how those two pilots kept us from running into stuff, but they followed orders kept it low and stayed off the radios.

Special note here about the "special" nav quipment - it was worthless!

One system said 20 miles left of course, the other 30 miles right. So they shot the middle! Finally, after a very close call they decided to try to climb out of the crap, with no success at 5000, they went back to the deck and finally cleared the storm. It was then that the HAC said, "we're over an hour late, I hope they wait for us!" That wasn't what I wanted to hear! We're lost, no homing beacon for Desert One and starting to run low on fuel. But, we made it to Desert One. As we approached we realized there were only three other 53s there - we were number four to arrive. Touchdown was probably the worst part! We were expecting hardpack - the sand was so deep (like several other aircraft) the nose tires bogged and came off the rims! "leapfrogging" to get close to the C130s, my guys came very close to losing it once. But we were in and started to refuel. I had work to do aboard and really don't know more than what has been reported about the decisions there. I do know from later discussions that the crew for Dash 5 wanted to continue and that LTC Seifert felt very strongly that with a little compromise from COL Beckwith we could have proceeded. I do remember hearing the radio call that the mission was aborted.


I thought I'd never feel worse that when I heard that. Until Dash 3 hit the 130.

 I didn't see the impact - I heard the radio call for 3 the lift and reposition so the 130 could taxi for departure and looked out to see them lift. As soon as they pulled pitch the dust cloud obscured them and I turned away. Next thing was to flash and the noise. I looked through the cockpit and could see 3 atop the 130, engulfed in flames. Before we could get flight ready (one engine was offline to conserve fuel) we started get hit with cooked off ordinance and the Captain called Abandon Ship. We retreated to a perimeter and then got the order to load up on the 130s. Several of the Marines volunteered to go back to recover survivors or casualties but were ordered (under duress) to load up. We flew back to an "undisclosed" location and eventually back to the East Coast.


We were sequestered for several days and then placed of Admin leave for about 30 days. I eventually reported back to HM-14, terminated my extension and left the service. About a month after that I (and I'm told all the members of the unit) received the DOD Meritorious Service Medal in the mail, with instructions not to display it or discuss the mission until I received authorization to do so. I've yet to get that authorization.

I did receive a very nice note from Major General Vaught. I think he described it best as " a best effort try, against overwhelming odds, by dedicated Americans." None of us were wanna be heroes, but the orders came down and we did what we had to and what we could.


Was the mission flawed? Yes, but the people who tried did what they felt was best, at the time, for all the right reasons. We lost eight great Americans...three that I got to know well and admire to this day. My greatest hope is that the lessons are not forgotten and that the politicians will remember to simply give the order and leave the execution to the experts the country is so lucky to have.

I want to thank No Greater Love for all that they have done to honor the fallen. What they accomplished at Arlington is exceptional.

Here is some of the Marine Air Crew at Yuma
They have asked to remain anonymous

Here are some comments by one of the Marine Air Crewmen that was actually at Desert One.

He has requested to remain anonymous. What he has to say is a sad reminder, that many times people want to link themselves to a heroic event that they had no part of. I am proud that I was off the coast and a part of the 31st MAU, but can only wish that I was on the actual mission. This is one of the men that actually went, and what he has to say on some things...

Thank you for your latest email...You know I was involved with that mission from the time it started in Nov 79 until the 25 of April. I looked at the hostages pictures every day for that time and you know I forgot there were women still held. Thank you for reminding me of that fact. Yes I was on the rescue mission, I was..(XXXXX)..I was given your website address by a friend who forwarded it to me late Saturday night... Over the past 20 years I have encountered numerous glory hounds who claim to have been on the rescue mission. One was a general who was telling everyone he was the one who made the decision to launch the mission and to abort the mission. He was stationed in (xxxxx) at the time. President Carter was in direct control of the mission and made the calls. Maj Gen Vaught, US Army, was the mission commander and was in direct link with the White House and President Carter. The General in..(XXXXX)..didn't even know such a mission was being launched until he saw it on CNN. This general was telling students that he was the one who did it all. I got word to him but he never responded. There have been several others and it really bothers me that someone would be that low down to try to bring attention to themselves and take credit for something they didn't do and especially when good men died...It was very informative. SSGT Dewey Johnson, Sgt Harvey, and Cpl Holmes were very dear friends of mine and I left them in the desert that night. That still brings tears to my eyes even today. I don't think it will ever go away, so I take it personal when people try to attach themselves to the mission only to bring attention to themselves. Maybe I'm too sensitive about it...I did recognize a Marine I served with in a 46 outfit in one of your photos. Echevera and I were in a squadron on the east coast at one time. That has been a long time ago.

Thank you for the website. Take care and SEMPERFI.

Folks, these  real heroes!
He and all the other people I have been in contact with have proven to be nothing more than true gentlemen, absolutely worthy of our respect and honor!
If you know of anyone who was actually on the mission, or trained directly in preparation for this mission, have them contact me at rescueattempt@rescueattempt.com
I am specifically asking Air Force Crews and Army Rangers and Delta Force to contact me with any stories and photographs that would let the world know just what happened that day to honor the men who died.
I would like to put their version of events online for all to see.
Again, I make no money on this site, and I never will. It is done to keep the memory alive of those who died tryng to free Americans held Illegally by the Iranian government led by the Ayatollahs.
If they desire, their identity will be held in the strictist confidence.


This is me in 1980, Cpl James E. Bancroft. I was a 20 year old Corporal in the United States Marine Corps at that time. My MOS was 7242, Air Support Operations Operator. That was actually a glorified radio operator type job, receiving, processing, and coordinating Air Support requests from ground units and relaying the information to aircraft to control air strikes, med-evac, and troop re-supply. While on board this ship, the USS Okinawa, LPH-3, I was kind of dead weight, actually. While on board ship, I did not do my MOS. I could have controlled aircraft from within the Navy's SACC center, but they had a different radar than I trained on, and they had too many new people themselves to let us train on the job.

This is the jeep I would have driven if we went in the field. It is a MRC-87, an M151-A2 Jeep, with a TRC-75 HF radio on the back, and two radios on top to speak on UHF to pilots directly. This shot was taken in the Philippenes in 1980.


Here is a scanned copy of the letter I wrote home the day after the attempt. Seems kind of small, not too much written at the time, eh? Well, we did not know much then, almost all I know of the event I learned afterwards. I was in the Arabian Sea, and knew almost nothing!

What I do remember is this: At 4 AM I got off Guard Duty. I was guarding the brig, two guys stole a radio, and I volunteered to be a guard. I went to the hanger deck to wait for early chow, which was at 05:00. I was hanging out on the hanger deck, when a sailor came down from CIC and exclaimed, "Man, there's F-14's and A-6's flying all OVER Iran!" We knew something was up, for the day before, we had our flight crews sent to bed at 16:00! That's right, in the afternoon, and under orders, too! So, knowing this, I informed the two prisoners what was ging on. I spent the night reading my Bible as I usually did, just sitting at the desk I was assigned, wondering what was happening. When that sailor came down to the hanger deck, the wonder increased, and so did the excitement. We were doing SOMETHING! What, we didn't know, just something.

I went to chow, and when others woke up at 06:00 at reville, I told them what I had heard. We were going to a modified General Quarters every day for the previous week, with gunners mates and missile operators manning their general quarters stations every day at 07:00, and this day was no different.

When 10:00 came around, I was sleeping, and the ship went to a full General Quarters, "Set Condition Zebra Throughout the Ship!", and they even announced, "Man your battle stations!" which is NOT a normal announcement for general quarters when in peacetime, regardless of where we were. Even during general quarters drills, I have never heard that phrase, and assumed it was just a movie line or something leftover from WWII. Well, we heard it that day for sure.

The upper two decks, the O-2 and O-1 Levels were sealed off, and NO ONE who did not belong on those decks was allowed, and that was something new. No One who came down from those decks would talk, either! It was a great mystery.

The next day, I was sitting on the S-2 office and speaking with several people when I told my side of what I had heard. S-2 was the intelligence section, and the GySgt in charge, Gunny Dinghus was adamant about secrecy. There was a Cpl in there, Adams, and he was looking scared stiff. Dinghus insisted on his silence, so he knew something. When I informed Dinghus of what I knew, he turned to me angrily, and insisted on me telling him who told me this. I told him the truth, that the Aircraft over Iran statement came at 04:30 or so from a sailor, he stormed out of the room, and when he returned later, he ignored me for a minute, then turned to me and said, "Bancroft, you are NOT to repeat this to ANYBODY, You hear me? Anybody!" I almost chuckled, because I thought it was just a warning, thinking that I really knew nothing, but he repeated himself, and in a very angry manner. All I could think was, WOW.


A small group of us from HMM-165 had a reunion in 1993 in Virginia.Here we are as older men, sometime in 1993, 13 years later at a re-union in Virginia. In the back row, left to right is me, Doug Findlay, John Hamilton, Frank Echevarria, and 'Top' Burdett. In the front row, left to right is Tom Gaynor, Leo Beery, Ron Winner, and Terry Gunnoe. Seated in the front, left to right, Todd Preece, Al Boscaglia, and Al 'J.R.' Barton.

This picture below was taken April 24, 1980
This is Cpl Harrington flying SAR for the rescue mission


David ( Buck ) Lee

Jim, it's been over 20 years since all this happened. My memories of What happened on the U.S.S. Okinawa ( LPH-3 ) differ in a few minor details. What I remember most is the anger. Anger that this could happen, and nothing was being done.

As a sergeant and CH-46 crew chief I certainly wasn't asked for much advice about what to do. I remember that we spent a lot of time keeping our aircraft ready to fly, but that was normal. There really wasn't much else to do out there. I can't remember the date, but the whole squadron had an in ranks inspection by the MAU commander. It wasn't a big deal, but the Sergeant Major ( SGTMAJ Sergeant ) was sure nervous. He just knew that one or more of us would make him look bad. as I remember it, they looked at every body, The MAU asked most of us a few questions like where we were from, what were our jobs, things like that. When it was all over and just as the formation was being dismissed is when things started to change.

Some one, as I remember it was GySgt Charley Thorpe from avionics called all the crew chiefs over. He told us to make sure our aircraft were ready to go, an accurate up to the minute status was urgently needed. The status of the aircraft was always a major concern so we didn't think anything of it.

The next thing got our attention. He told us when we were done, to hit the rack and get some sleep, we would need it! This was fairly early in the morning and was definitely not normal. I remember going up to the deserted flight deck and wondering what was going on. Off in the distance we saw several ships going in the opposite direction, very fast.

All of a sudden the ship went to general quarters. This happened a lot. But the first thing usually said was " this is a drill this is a drill " not this time. For a few minutes there was chaos. A crew chiefs battle station is where ever his aircraft is. If it has to moved he's there to ride brakes. We stood around wondering what was going on when the Capt. ( Capt. Zirbel) came over the 1mc and said there had been a generator fire and every thing was all right.

We went down for lunch and saw .50 cal ammo being brought up to the hanger deck. The only .50's were our door guns! At lunch is when the Capt. announced that there had been a rescue attempt, but it failed due equipment failure. The weird thing was that they heard this on radio Moscow.

I don't think anyone really new what had happened until we got to Mombassa, Kenya and later to Perth, Australia and could read about it. I was kind of irate that we weren't able to get involved, this is what we spent long hard hours training for. I'm sure my memories differ from others, it has been over 20 years. I enjoyed my visit to you site and will be back. David T. (Buck) Lee CH-46 crew chief, HMM-165.


Dear Shipmate Bancroft,
I visited your site about the Iranian rescue attempt. My name is Barry Marple and I'm president and webmaster for the Airborne Mine Countermeasures Association. I found your site to be very informative and it's obvious that you feel as I do that the events of Desert One should never be forgotten. ....

I was an Aviation Machinist Mate First Class and at the time of Desert One I was an RH-53D Power Plants and Rotors Related Maintenance Instructor at Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 12 at NAS Norfolk where the RH-53D's originated. My biggest question that I still have today is why did the Army and Air Force commanders tell their stories shortly after the incident. Everyone on the operation signed papers and swore an oath of silence. To this day the Marine and Navy crews have not told their story. I think that's pretty commendable.

We, the Airborne Mine Countermeasures Association had it's very first reunion the weekend of April 1 and one of the Navy aircrew that was in Desert One spent a lot of time with me talking about the mission.

It's now 20 years since Desert Storm and by law that a full accounting of the Operation should be made public.

I'm pretty busy on a bunch of web site projects that I really need to accomplish before I even think about updating existing pages. But in a few weeks or more I should be adding quite a few photos which pertain to the Operation Eagle Claw/ Evening Light.

Most are photos taken just prior to the RH-53D's leaving the USS Nimitz. The Airborne Mine Countermeasures community is still getting bad hits over the Desert One issue. I've heard from some that still belong to the Air Force Special Operations that they have no love for the AMCM community. It seem's they blame the RH-53D and it's people for the mission failure. I sure wish the real story would become public so that the hero's of that mission can have some closure.

I can't really say I blame the Marine pilots because there was a mix of Marine and Navy pilots. I do find fault with an all-service operation. There is no way the Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy can make an operation successful. The Marine officer in charge of the helicopters was in favor of continuing on.

The aircraft that turned back was piloted by a Navy pilot from one of the Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadrons (Navy). When the aircraft turned around it was after they were flying in a sand storm for about 45 minutes without any navigation aids which means he not only had no idea which direction he was flying but he had no idea at what attitude (not altitude). When a helicopter pilot is faced with that situation it doesn't take long before vertigo takes over. The aircraft never broke radio silence. If he had they might have continued on because the C-130's had flown through the same sand storm and knew that within 15 or 20 minutes the helicopters would have been free of the storm. Aborting the mission for the suspected BIM (Blade Integrity Monitoring System) was a bad call. Your correct. The Marines had a standing order that a visual bad BIM was an immediate abort and land aircraft ASAP. The RH-53D was a best of the best as far as helicopter and had the latest technology. Factory tests prove that a bad BIM would still enable the main rotor blade to be serviceable for at least 15 hours. Seeing as the mission was a one way trip in that the helicopters were never coming back from Tehran they should have continued on. But we must also realize that the crew had already gone through hell flying through the sand storm. The real screw up was the idiot that ordered the helicopter to move to another C-130 for fuel because the aircraft commander of the original C-130 had just enough fuel for it to make it back to their duty station. I think the smart thing to do would have been to abort the C-130 and have them pump all of their fuel into the RH-53D. But that's not what happened. Once the RH-53D crashed into the C-130 there was no going on. The remaining helicopters were Un-flyable due to flying shrapnel for the ordinance that was blowing up. In all honesty, I think if the mission had continued on we would have lost a whole lot more than 8 heroes.


This is an account by a former Marine named Dan Gatewood. He and I were on board the USS Okinawa this cruise. Dan was attached to 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment in Kaneohe. Here is his story:

The Hostage Rescue Attempt - I think that the thing I remember the most about that episode is the waiting. I was a Squad Leader in 2nd platoon of Kilo 3/3. Our platoon had been trained as a helicopter assault unit, so we were very familiar with the necessary tactics for a mission such as the one being considered. We spent most of our time on station going through training scenarios. There was a concern about the possibility of a chemical attack, so we spent a considerable amount of time running squad exercises throughout the ship wearing our NBC suits. That was pleasant! Especially when we ran up and down the ladders all over the ship hunting for the enemy.

It seemed as though we were always waiting to hear some news. Were we going in? Was there going to be a full-scale assault? Were the Russians going to try something? Unfortunately, an infantry squad leader doesn't hear much in the way of top-level plans of action. Sometimes the information was pretty slow to roll downhill. I know of at least one Marine from 2nd platoon who was taken over to the Nimitz (I think it was the Nimitz), as part of the group who were supposed to be ready in case the mission failed. They were to be the back-up force to try again if that decision were to be made.

We spent much of our time training, doing PT on the flight deck, and sweating in the hold. Do you remember sleeping on the flight deck? We were allowed to sleep on the flight deck after the air conditioning system failed. At least that's what we were told. I think it was still working in some parts of the ship. And the showers. I remember they told us that at least one of the fresh water units had gone out so we could not take fresh water showers. We were allowed to take as many salt water showers as we wanted. Man, that was fun.

I remember breaking out live ammo. The scuttlebutt was that we were close enough for them to shoot some missiles at us, so we needed to be ready. I was never told what exactly we would do with the live ammo if they hit our ship with a missile, but being a good Marine, I followed orders and got ready. One thing that truly impressed me was how different people reacted. The vast majority (at least from Kilo company), were ready. I don't think any of us were overly excited about the possibility of getting into an armed conflict, but we all were ready and willing to do our duty. We would have carried out our orders implicitly. We had a great group of Officers, and a very strong corps of Non-commissioned officers. We were a very tight unit. We had trained long and hard together and to this day I believe we would have accomplished any task we would have been given.

Semper Fi,


You can contact Dan AT: Dan@Two-Brothers.com

Letter from Vic Albright

Hello, shipmate!
I first wish to commend you for the best, most researched piece I have seen to date on Desert One. Having "been there" like yourself, I feel that it is high time that the full story be told.
I am a former Missile Fire Control Technician from the USS Gridley, who, as you pointed out in your essay, was an escort for Okinawa and several other amphibious ships. Gridley also had the distinction, as you remember, of towing Okinawa following a boiler mishap.
I am pleased to see that your site describes the Soviet presence in the area at the time, and the constant shadowing by that AGI, along with numerous Bear overflights. You are the only one that I have found so far that has reported this. As I recall, in the days prior to and just after Desert One, you could practically walk across the North Arabian Sea there were so many ships in the region.
My recollection of that fated day was when Gridley's Commanding Officer announced over the ship's 1MC, "Well, Gents, You may start earning your money today!" and went further on to describe the events that occured at Desert One, including the helo - plane crash and the deaths of eight of our comrades. He further stated that if we went to General Quarters, it would be "for real" and that we should carry out our duties as American fighting men.
Which brings me to the reason I am writing you. Given the presence of the Soviet AGI, the recon planes, and the numerous warships, I cannot help but feel that an even bigger event was taking place at that moment in history. We were part of a very large amphibious assault group, obviously letting the whole world know where we were headed. I truly thought we were intent at that time of taking on Iran, and that Desert One was but a small part of a much bigger picture. The huge Soviet presence in the area seemed to say that they would no way in hell allow us back into Iran (most likely as you pointed out, this was related to the intel sites there along with Iran's common border with Afghanistan). I believe that particular moment in history put us eyeball to eyeball with the Soviet Union in a way not seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis, and we narrowly avoided a general war with the Soviets. Since all this happened over twenty years ago, I am certain that you, myself, and everybody else involved, not to mention the American public, would like to see a full account of what exactly transpired on those dark days besides the obvious tragedy at Desert One.
Vic has left his e-mail for any to contact him, especially former Gridley Shipmates!

I had an Iranian man send me a message from the guestbook. (At least it seems like he is. He did not leave me his e-mail, and for his safety and anonymity, I am leaving his name out of the message.)

Here is his message:

"Iranian Man"
Comments: This brough back a lot of sad memories from what happened in Iran, hostages and the men who lost their lives trying to rescue the hostages. I always wished that none of this would have happened and that our two countries maintained the same friendly status. Although from what I hear hopefully in the near future it may happen. Good luck.

I recieved 2 more letters from Iranian men, and only this one is repeatable,the other was filled with vulgarities quite unbecoming of a Muslim. This man was against us, but he was polite about it.

Sep 13 2000 9:55 AM seyed mohammad reza hosseini Comments: my dear friend.in iran we say:"no one should play with the lions tail.

This Iranian man should remember, we did NOT go in in force, and the shooting never started. He would be ashamed to admit who the lion would be.

We have a saying here in the US: Made in US, Tested in Japan, Mess with us, and We'll do it again.


Click on the photo above, where we will read more of the hostages captiviy, and a photo section of many of the Hostages taken from Life Magazine.